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INTERSTATE PREEMPTION: THE -RIGHT TO
TRAVEL, THE RIGHT TO LIFE, AND THE
RIGHT TO DIE
Lea Brilmayer*

State laws differ, and they differ on issues of tremendous importance to the ways that we conduct our lives. Abortion and the right to
die are two issues on which state law intersects with deeply held moral
convictions, and on which state laws vary. 1 With so much hanging in
the balance, it is not surprising that those who find themselves outvoted or outmaneuvered in local political processes sometimes seek a
legal climate more compatible with their beliefs about human decency
and dignity. The right to "vote with one's feet" - to travel or move
to another state and trade a law one finds repugnant for a better one is defined and circumscribed by the constitutional limitations peculiar
to the conflict of laws.
The relevance of conflicts to the abortion issue is as follows. To
the extent that our courts continue to read the U.S. Constitution as
including a right to abortion, no conflicts analysis is needed because
state law is uniform. 2 To the extent that the Court decides to relegate
control over abortion to the states, however, conflicts issues resurface.
The question then arises whether one state can apply its law to abortions that have connections with other states. In particular, a state
that outlaws abortions might attempt to prohibit its residents from
traveling to states where abortions are legal and terminating their
pregnancies there. Criminalization would most likely not take the
form of an outright prohibition on leaving the state, but would rather
• Benjamin F. Butler Professor, New York University School of Law. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1976,
California-Berkeley; LL.M. 1978, Columbia. - Ed. The author wishes to thank a number of
colleagues for their comments on an earlier draft: Akhil Amar, Larry Kramer, Linda Silberman,
Chris Eisgruber, Burt Neuborne, Steve Bradford, Doug Laycock, Gerry Neumann, Sylvia Law,
Brookes Billman, and Ricky Revesz. Seth Kreimer and Steve Bradford shared drafts of their
own work on the same topic, and the participants at faculty workshops at Pace and NYU Law
Schools provided valuable comments. Special thanks to Joni Charme for her excellent research
on state abortion laws (among other things), and to The Filomen D'Agostino & Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund for supporting this research in the summer of 1992.
1. Another important moral issue that raised questions of the conflict of laws was slavery.
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. Of course, there may still be variations in state laws on abortion even given a basic right of
reproductive choice. Some states may have parental consent laws, for instance, that other states
decline to adopt. Uniformity is guaranteed only to the extent that federal law mandates some
particular outcome.
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involve the penalization of conduct undertaken while in the other
state. Other conflicts problems may arise out of abortion - whether a
state can prohibit advertising abortion services within its borders when
the abortion itself would take place in a state where abortion is legal;
whether a state can prohibit nonresidents from using its abortion clinics; and so forth - but the residence problem seems most likely to
pose frequent and substantial problems. 3 This article asks, then,
whether states can regulate the reproductive activities of local residents when they are temporarily present in other states.
The right to die intersects with conflict of laws in similar ways. In
1990, the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri law that prevented the
parents of Nancy Cruzan, who lay in a permanent vegetative state,
from disconnecting her life support system.4 Other states were apparently more willing to recognize a "right to die." 5 But in a case remarkably similar to Cruzan, Missouri subsequently took the position
that a father could not remove his daughter from the hospital for purposes of taking her to Minnesota, a state that would afford greater
discretion in allowing her to die. 6 The right-to-die issue is most
closely analogous to the abortion issue in cases where the patient has
already gone or been taken to another state, and the home state seeks
to prevent family members or the guardian from helping to terminate
her life by threatening to prosecute them when they return. Again, the
question is whether people's home states can regulate their activities
when they are temporarily present in a place where those activities are
legal.
3. The issue of nonresident access to abortion services might seem resolved by Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973), which held that Georgia could not prohibit nonresidents from using its
abortion clinics. But it is arguable that Doe would not apply in a post-Roe world. A state might
claim that its refusal of access to nonresident women constituted deference to the laws of the
woman's home state, which prohibited abortion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding a one-year residence requirement for divorce in part because Joi-a might legitimately
wish to discourage nonresidents from going to Iowa to avoid their home state's onerous divorce
requirements). The use of durational presence may still be unsettled. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.16.010(a)(4) (1991) (requiring a woman to be physically present or domiciled in the state for
thirty days before obtaining an abortion).
4. Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 667, 670-72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding
right to die and substituted judgment of guardian), modified, 741 P.2d 674, 681-90 (Ariz. 1987)
(affirming right to die; limiting guardian's discretion); McConnell v. Beverly Enter.-Conn., Inc.,
553 A.2d 596, 600-04 (Conn. 1989) (upholding right to die); In re Guardianship of Browning,
568 So. 2d 4, 10-12 (Fla. 1990) (upholding right to die); see also ALA. CODE§§ 22-8A-1 to 228A-10 (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-8-11-1 to 16-8-11-22 (West 1992); Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601 to 5-614
(1990).
.
6. In re Busalacchi, No. 59,582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991); see also
Tamar Lewin, Man Is Allowed to Let Daughter Die, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at A7 (reporting
that the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the case, allowing the father to remove the
feeding tube).
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This article argues that, although the answer may depend upon the
precise contours of state regulation, at least in the abortion and right
to die cases states typically cannot regulate their citizens' conduct in
this way. States do possess the power to regulate their citizens' conduct in other states in the usual case. I will argue, however, that abortion (and, analogously, the right to die) is not "the usual case." Most
states that choose not to prohibit abortion to the extent constitutionally permissible are not merely expressing a simple lack of interest in
the abortion issue. They are, instead, affirmatively granting to those
within their borders the freedom to make the choice whether to have
an abortion.
If that is the policy that most states' prochoice laws express, then a
prolife state's attempt to prohibit abortions extraterritorially clashes
directly with the territorial state's desire to ensure freedom of choice.
Such regulation is constitutionally invalid because, in cases of direct
conflict, territoriality (the place where the abortion is performed)
trumps residence (the place where the woman, resides). Similarly,
states recognizing a right to die are probably granting an affirmative
freedom to those who choose to end their lives; extraterritorial regulation by states who fail to recognize that freedom is thus prohibited.
But how can one be so sure that a failure to prohibit abortion or
termination of life constitutes an affirmative grant of freedom - a license, so to speak - rather than a simple lack of interest in the subject? Indeed, is there even a discemable difference between a state's
grant of an affirmative license to make up one's own mind and a state's
simple failure to regulate? In order to clarify the difference, I rely on
an analogy to federal preemption. Often, states seek to penalize something that the federal government has chosen not to prohibit. Sometimes such a penalty is permissible, but sometimes the state's efforts
are preempted. It all depends on whether the federal failure to regulate represents a deliberate federal policy choice to allow a freedom, in
which case the state law is preempted, or whether Congress simply
failed to regulate out of indifference.
The preemption cases show how to determine whether federal and
state law are truly inconsistent, and in this way they offer a guide for
deciding whether two states' laws conflict. The abortion example, according to this analogy, supports a relatively easy argument for preemption of the residence state's restrictive law. Roe v. Wade 1 clearly
preempted state efforts to regulate abortion because it recognized a
right to choose; therefore, the residence state's efforts to bar abortion
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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would be invalid in any state having a Roe-like prochoice law. The
analogous right-to-die argument seems equally compelling.
The abortion issue, of course, may soon become moot: with Democrats in the White House, a federal freedom-of-choice statute may
become law. Even if a federal statute is passed, however, it may leave
some areas of regulation, such as waiting periods or parental notification provisions, to the states. Moreover, in other areas of state regulation of personal morality - the right to die is only one example - no
unifying federal legislation looms on the horizon.
And with disuniformity, conflicts will arise, for states might try to
regulate their citizens' activities abroad. Furthermore, state legislation
need not provide specifically for extraterritoriality for constitutional
choice-of-law problems to occur. All it would take would be for one
energetic public prosecutor in an antiabortion state to identify and decide to prosecute a woman who had left the state to terminate her
pregnancy, 8 or for one energetic prosecutor to charge with murder
those who helped to carry out the patient's wish to die. With few clear
constitutional precedents available to argue either way, the precise issue might seem at first to be an open one. I believe and argue here,
however, that the structure of our federal system clearly compels the
priority of the territorial state, and that this priority typically invalidates the residence state's claim to regulate.
The argument proceeds in several stages. First, I briefly outline
the general principle that a state may in most circumstances apply its
law to its residents, even when they are acting outside the state. I
argue next that, where there is a direct clash between the state of residence and the territorial state, the general principle yields, and territoriality trumps residence. Third, I claim that abortion involves just
such a clash because many states wish deliberately to preserve for women the right to choose abortion. The residence and territorial states'
policies thus collide. Prochoice laws, in other words, have "preemptive effect" on the residence state's antiabortion laws. I focus mainly
on abortion because that is where state law has most fully developed.
Next, I introduce the analogy to federal-state preemption. In the
same way that a U.S. constitutional decision to grant freedom of
choice preempts state laws that prohibit abortion, most states' deci8. In a well-publicized Irish case, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland)
- Ltd. v. Grogan, 57 C.M.L.R. 689 (Ir. S.C. 1989), a prosecutor sought to prohibit a young rape
victim from leaving for England to obtain an abortion. The Irish Supreme Court ultimately
ruled her free to go, but only on relatively narrow grounds that left the general right to travel
issue unresolved.
The various attempts by states to regulate abortions occurring in other states are described in
Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992).
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sions to permit abortion would preempt sister states• attempts to regulate abortions extraterritorially. The following section looks at
particular state laws allowing freedom of choice to assess which have
preemptive power - because they grant an affirmative right - and
which do not - because they exhibit mere indifference. On examination, as a matter of state law, the laws of the typical prochoice state
would appear to bar the extraterritorial application of prolife regulations. I close with some somewhat speculative remarks about the right
to die.
I. THE REsIDENCE PRINCIPLE

States are not constitutionally free to apply their laws whenever
they choose; application of local law is limited by the Due Process,
Commerce, and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. 9 No single connecting
factor uniquely validates the forum's claim to apply its faw; different
contacts are relevant in different sorts of cases. Among the various
contacts that have been used to justify application of a particular body
of law are the place where a contract was signed, the place where an
accident occurred, the place of employment, the location of defendant's unrelated business, and the residence of the regulated party. 10
This last connecting factor is of primary interest here.
A variety of legal doctrines reflect the general constitutional sufficiency of the residence factor as a basis for assertion of state authority.11 The defendant's residence, of course, is a constitutionally
adequate contact for personal jurisdiction. 12 It is also one of the rec9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
10. The residence of the party who would benefit from the application oflocal law is another
possibility. The Court has at various times alluded to this contact as a relevant connecting factor, but no Supreme Court case upholds application of local law on this ground alone. For
discussion of these factors, see generally LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 267-73 (1986).
11. In an earlier article, I discussed the different philqsophical bases for jurisdiction based on
local residence and jurisdiction based on local activities. See Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1 (1991). When a state applies its laws to its own
people, it relies on a communitarian political philosophy; when it applies its laws to activities
occurring in the state, or impact transpiring in the state, it relies on a liberal "tacit consent"
theory of political philosophy. This difference in philosophical foundations may account for why
so many Americans seem to assume that leaving one's home state frees one from home-state
laws. To the extent that people adopt a liberal consent-based theory of jurisdiction, and overlook
the possibility of communitarian justifications, they will find the home state's power to apply its
law to an absent defendant illogical. A liberal believes that people voluntarily enter into legal
obligations and can voluntarily set them aside; thus, one should incur legal obligations by entering the state and relinquish them by leaving it. To a communitarian, one's obligations remain so
long as one is a member of the community.
. 12. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
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ognized bases for regulation in international law. 13 The United States
drew upon this principle in its attempt to punish Bobby Fischer for
playing chess in Yugoslavia in violation of the international embargo.14 In domestic U.S. law, the best-known case upholding a
state's right to regulate its absent residents is Skiriotes v. Florida. 1s
Skiriotes involved a Florida law that prohibited using scuba gear to
gather sponges. The defendant claimed that he had been outside the
territorial waters of the state when he harvested sponges, but the
Supreme Court held his defense irrelevant. The fact that he was a
Florida resident provided an adequate nexus for imposition of the
Florida criminal prohibition.16
Despite the general principle that residence is an adequate basis for
state regulation, many people assume that one can escape the law of
one's residence by simply leaving the state temporarily. 17 Perhaps this
assumption dates to the era of the Nevada divorce, which provides a
deceptive analogy to interstate abortion. At one time, most states
were quite restrictive in granting divorces; a small number of states,
including Nevada, were considerably more lenient. This led to a
booming divorce business in Nevada, as individuals from other states
traveled there, obtained their divorces, and then returned home. One
would expect the same sort of "forum shopping" to occur if the
Supreme Court freed prolife states to regulate abortion as they saw fit.
Women desiring abortions but living in antiabortion states would
travel to the latter-day Nevada of their choice, obtain abortions, and
return home. It was always thus in the days before Roe v. Wade.
One obvious consequence of such arrangements is that those with
knowledge of prochoice states and money for travel can obtain abortions, while those who are less informed or less well endowed cannot.
This was true prior to Roe; the poor had no recourse but the back
alley. The same was true regarding divorce; only the well-off could
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2)
(1987).
14. See Stephen Labaton, Fischer Is Indicted Over Chess Match, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992,
at A3.
15. 313 U.S. 69 (1941); see also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (addressing
extraterritorial application of the federal subpoena power).
16. 313 U.S. at 76-77. In Skiriotes, the defendant was not present in another state when the
crime was committed; he was in international waters. The relevance of this point will be dis·
cussed infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
17. See, e.g., Steven Prokesch, New York State Crosses Hudson in Search of Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at BS (describing shock and outrage when New York shoppers in New
Jersey stores were told that New York intended to impose sales tax on their out-of-state
purchases); cf. supra note 11 (discussing philosophical basis for such an assumption).
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afford the trip to Nevada. The importance of this differential impact
on the poor should not be underestimated.
But abortion rights activists who focus solely on the cost factor are
overlooking another important issue. What worked with divorce may
not work with abortion, because Nevada divorces required at least a
technical change in domicile. Nevada law required the dissatisfied
spouse (often the husband) to travel to Nevada and then stay there
long enough to acquire a new (if admittedly merely technical) domicile.18 To require a woman seeking an abortion to remain in a state
long enough to acquire a new domicile is quite an imposition, particularly if the pregnancy is already somewhat advanced and delay raises
health and safety as well as cost issues. Of potentially even greater
importance, divorce is a judicial procedure; abortion is a medical procedure. The spouse who obtains a Nevada divorce gets a judicial declaration confirming her new domicile, which is entitled to at least a
degree of full faith and credit. 19 The woman who obtains an abortion
gets no judicial finding of domicile and thus no full-faith-and-credit
protection of any kind. She returns to her home state in fear that the
authorities will discover her abortion and prosecute her.
The most plausible c:oncem of women traveling to other states to
obtain an abortion, therefore, is that the state of residence will apply
its criminal prohibition to her on the grounds that her domicile never
changed. The Nevada divorce analogy does not protect her from this
possibility. Of course, a state may have difficulty finding out about
abortions performed out of state and prosecuting after the fact. But
such prosecutions are far from impossible. The woman's spouse, boyfriend, or parent may seek to prevent the abortion by threatening to go
to the authorities afterwards, or a prolife group might publicize the
names of women who visit abortion clinics in other states. The added
burden of fear and secrecy that results from the likelihood that a woman's home state may discover and prosecute her is far from
insubstantial. 20
The home state of a terminally ill individual could use similar ar18. On domicile as a basis for divorce jurisdiction, see Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287 (1942) (Williams I). A residence period of one year was upheld in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975). The Nevada divorce upheld in Williams I required a residence of only six weeks.
317 U.S. at 290 n.3.
19. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II), allowed relitigation of the
domicile issue by the state in a subsequent bigamy proceeding. The state was not foreclosed
because it had not been a party to the earlier case. However, the Court recognized a presumption
that the prior finding of domicile was correct; the challenger would bear the burden of proof. 325
U.S. at 233-34; see also Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
20. See Kreimer, supra note 8 (describing efforts by prolife states to harass women obtaining
abortions elsewhere).
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guments if the individual sought physician-assisted suicide or termina. tion of life support in another state. In such cases, of course, the state
would almost certainly not prosecute posthumously if the individual
were successful. However, anyo~e who assisted the suicide could be
subject to prosecution under the residence principle if he or she were a
resident of the individual's home state. The situation becomes more
complicated if the assistant is not a resident of that state, or if the state
seeks to prevent the patient from leaving in the first place. We will
return to these complications later.21 The underlying principle of residence-based extraterritoriality, however, seems unchanged from the
abortion context.
The practical importance of the residence principle, then, should
not be underestimated. While there is no case directly on point,22 colorable support exists for the conclusion that a state may regulate its
citizens who have abortions or terminate their lives elsewhere. Skiriotes 23 plays a central role in this prima facie argument. Yet Skiriotes
contains a key element on which we have not yet focused. In Skiriotes
the activity in question took place outside the territorial waters of the
state, but not within the jurisdiction of any other state of the Union. 24
There was, in other words, no territorial state. In the abortion and
right-to-die contexts, in contrast, there is a territorial state, and thus a
real possibility of a clash of policies. In Skiriotes, all that was required
for application of forum law was that the forum exhibit a nexus with
the dispute; no other state could also have a nexus, so the interests of
two states could not directly collide. The fact that Skiriotes did not
address such conflicts between two states leaves us the question of
what to do when such a conflict does occur.
II.

WHY TERRITORIALITY TRUMPS REsIDENCY

Should a state be able to apply its law simply because it has a nexus
with the controversy in question, regardless of the connection between
the controversy and other states? If the answer is yes, then states
should be free to regulate the reproductive activities or deaths of their
citizens even when they are temporarily absent from the state; the
nexus is the individual's residence. But focusing solely on the exist21. See infra Part VI.
22. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Court suggested in dictum that Virginia
could not prevent its citizens from going to New York to obtain abortions. 421 U.S. at 822·24.
However, Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, which had been decided during the pendency of the litigation,
was one possible explanation for this· assertion. If Roe were reversed, the Bigelow argument
might therefore be invalid.
23. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
24. 313 U.S. at 76-79.
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ence of a geographical connection with the dispute opens the prospect
that several states might each have jurisdiction over the same dispute;
both the residence and the territorial state might have legislative
authority. 25
Where concurrent jurisdiction poses constitutional problems, the
mere fact that a nexus exists may not produce an adequate basis for
applying forum law. There are two key issues in assessing the constitutionality of concurrent jurisdiction: whether the various states' laws
directly clash, and whether a way exists to prioritize the contending
laws to determine which one should trump. 26 I illustrate the first issue
- inconsistent regulation - by some recent Supreme Court cases applying the Commerce Clause to interstate disputes; I illustrate the second - prioritizing - by the Court's discussion of full faith and credit.
While inconsistent state regulation has occasionally surfaced as a
due process theme, 27 it has figured more prominently in applications
of the Commerce Clause. 28 An early set of cases examined the efforts
of states to regulate trucks that traveled across the state.29 In one, the
25. This statement actually simplifies the problem somewhat, because it considers only a
single residence factor and a single territorial factor, as if our choice between residence and
territoriality were enough to resolve the problem of concurrent jurisdiction. In fact, there are
several possible residence factors (residence of the patient, residence of the doctor, corporate
affiliation of the hospital, and so forth) and several possible territorial factors (place where the
abortion or death takes place, place where the decision is made, place where the patient or fetus
would have continued to live, and so forth).
I focus here on the two most likely candidates: the place of the abortion or death, and the
residence of the woman or patient. More precisely, I mean to argue that, where concurrent
jurisdiction is impermissible, only one state may govern, and that should be the state where the
abortion or death takes place. All of the reasons for disallowing an additional state to regulate
apply equally for other sorts of territorial factors and other sorts of residence factors.
26. I prefer to talk about direct clash rather than "conflict" because the latter word has come
to have something of a technical meaning in the conflicts literature. In modem choice·of-law
theory, conflict tends to be assessed by reference to Brainerd Currie's theory of interest analysis.
See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). As I
will explain in the discussion below, however, my determination whether a direct clash exists
does not have very much in common with Currie's analysis of whether a "true conflict" exists.
In particular, the discussion below attaches great importance to territorial connecting factors and
territorial sovereignty. Currie relied almost entirely on residential, as opposed to territorial, connecting factors. See id. at 703 (the concern of the state is with people, not locations); see also Lea
Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 18 MICH. L. REv. 392, 395-97
(1980) (discussing reliance on domicile). In addition, Currie thought of states as having interests
only in applymg their laws to benefit local parties. See Brilmayer, supra, at 398 (arguing that
residents get the best of both worlds); John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARYL. REv. 173 (1981); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 249, 274 (1992). Here, re5idence factors are used to penalize forum residents.
27. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Comerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
28. For a discussion of inconsistent state regulation, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 434-36 (2d ed. 1988).
29. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); South Carolina State,Righway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan,
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forum had a regulation requiring trucks to be equipped with a certain
sort of mud flap. 30 Because other states either did not require or even
prohibited such mud flaps, the law in question posed the threat of inconsistent regulation. The forum certainly had a "nexus" with the
dispute; the trucks were traveling along its highways. The problem
stemmed not from a lack of nexus, but from the fact that too many
states seemed to have a claim to regulate: there was concurrent jurisdiction. As a theoretical matter, perhaps trucks could have stopped at
the border and changed their equipment; practically speaking, however, this was not feasible.
Two recent sets of Commerce Clause cases, one dealing with state
takeover regulation and one dealing with regulation of liquor pricing,
also illustrate the importance of the inconsistent regulation theme. In
the takeover context, the Court based its holding that only one state
might regulate corporate takeovers in part on the fact that multiple
states might impose inconsistent requirements on interstate takeovers. 31 Similarly, in the liquor pricing cases, the Court invalidated a
state's attempts to regulate "extraterritorially" in part because of the
possibility that one state would impose a set of prices that another
state prohibited. 32
Of course, invalidating concurrent jurisdiction is problematic if a
court has no way to determine which of the contending states has a
superior claim to regulate. This brings us to our second key issue in
determining whether a particular exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is
constitutionally appropriate: is there a way to prioritize? An early
full-faith-and-credit case illustrates this issue. 33 At one point the
Court had appeared to hold that concurrent jurisdiction was never appropriate - that a single state (the place of contracting, or the place
where the tort occurred) was uniquely qualified to apply its law. 34 In
clarifying that concurrent jurisdiction was no longer generally impermissible, the Court noted that eliminating concurrent jurisdiction required a way of determining which state had the superior claim to
apply its law, a way that the Court did not have on the particular facts
325 U.S. 761 (1945) (involving regulation of railroad cars). See generally LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICTS OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 124 (1991).
30. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 520. Illinois required contoured rear-fender mudguards; Arkansas
actually prohibited them.
31. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987).
32. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336-40 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1986).
33. See Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Commn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
34. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 213-14 (1922) (applying "place of
contracting" rule).
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at issue. 35 Absent a priority rule, the prohibition on concurrent jurisdiction would simply have required each state to defer to the law of
the other state. 36 If the case were brought in state A, then the A courts
would have to apply state B's law; if brought in state B, then B would
have to apply A's law. The Court denied that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause could be read to compel such a strange result. 37
Having mentioned due process, the Commerce Clause, and full
faith and credit, the natural question is what to make of the right to
travel. Intuitively, this seems to be the constitutional protection that
tracks most closely the defendant's claim to escape home-state law by
leaving the state. 38 The obvious problem with relying directly on the
right to travel in the abortion context, however, is that the state is not
denying anyone the right to leave its borders; nor is it even creating a
disincentive to leave. It is merely saying that, when one is absent from
the state, one must nonetheless obey state law.
In a sense, then, the right-to-travel argument is parasitic upon the
claim that the home state cannot regulate extraterritorially. The rightto-travel argument works only so long as it rests on a state's underlying inability to regulate the resident's activities in other states. Surely,
if the home state is not entitled to apply its law extraterritorially, then
it may not condition leaving the state upon agreeing to obey state law
while absent. On the other hand, if the state were entitled to regulate
extraterritorially, then the right to travel would not seem to impose an
additional bar. 39 To put it another way, the "right to travel" by itself
does not specify which law will apply once one gets to the other state.
To decide this issue, we must consult the constitutional limits on extraterritorial application of local law - and here, again, the most directly relevant provisions are due process, full faith and credit, and the
Commerce Clause.40
The constitutional limits on concurrent jurisdiction, as just noted,
35. See Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547.
36. Or, conceivably, neither state should be allowed to regulate. This solution has little to
recommend it.
37. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547.
38. See Seth Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . . ·~ The Right to Travel and
Extraterritorial Abortion, 91 MICH. L. REv. 907 (1993).
39. For example, even those who rely upon the right to travel allow the state to prohibit
action having a direct impact in the home state. See id. at 921-22. For instance, assume that a
resident of state A travels into state B and then fires a gun across the border into state A to kill his
ex-lover. Surely state A does not violate the right to travel by prosecuting for murder, because A
has an underlying right to criminalize the conduct in question.
40. I will return to the right to travel in my discussion of the right to die. See infra Part VI.
For even if a state cannot criminalize physician-assisted suicide in another state, it may try to
prevent the patient from leaving; at this juncture, the right to travel once again becomes directly
relevant.
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turn on whether policies directly clash and whether some way exists to
prioritize the two states seeking to regulate. I will tum to the issue of
whether a direct clash exists in the next section. Regarding the second
issue - prioritization - a clear answer exists. At least for abortion
cases, territoriality trumps residence. 41 As a general matter, applying
the territorial state's law usually makes sense when two sets of policies
are inconsistent.42 Particularly in the abortion context, though, the
territorial state's claim to regulate is paramount; indeed, states, if
forced to choose, would probably exercise their territorial authority
and give up their residence-based authority.
Three approaches are possible when concurrent jurisdiction is unworkable: one might favor the territorial state categorically; one
might favor the residence state categorically; or one might make some
kind of case-by-case assessment. The last alternative has obvious
problems. A court could perform case-by-case assessments either by
applying some balancing test that considered both residential and territorial factors 43 or simply by allowing the forum to apply its own law.
Neither method provides the prospective defendant with enough certainty to predict which rule will govern her conduct. The problem is
particularly acute in the case of criminal law for two reasons. First,
our legal system justifiably emphasizes predictability where criminal
penalties are at stake. Second, because there is no issue preclusion in
interstate criminal law - the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar all
sequential criminal prosecutions in different states44 - an amorphous
balancing test or one allowing each state to apply its own law would
effectively permit successive prosecutions under inconsistent laws. 45
Where one state's law directly required what the other expressly prohibited, defendants would be subject to inconsistent commands.
Where, closer to the issues at hand, one expressly licensed what the
other prohibited, potential defendants could protect themselves only
41. I will argue that a clear priority rule also exists for right-to-die cases. See infra Part VI.
42. There has been a resurgence of interest in territorialism. The article that will surely
become the classic modem defense of territoriality is Laycock, supra note 26, especially Part IV,
at 315. See also David S. Welkowitz, Pre-Emption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State
Antidilution Laws, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1'(1992); compare Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454
(N.Y. 1972) (adopting territorial rules in case of conflict); Ely, supra note 26, at 217 (turning to
territorial rules where no common domicile exists). See also Kreimer, supra note 8.
43. For example, the Supreme Court might require states to use the "most significant relationship" test of the REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 6 (1969).
44. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-93 (1985). Note that two different parties - the two
states - are involved, so that issue preclusion does not bar the state from bringing the second
prosecution under the Due Process Clause.
·
45. Compare the problems with applying the "domicile" test in interstate estate taxation.
See generally BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 387. The vagueness of the domicile test
potentially submits the estate to multiple taxation.
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by conforming to the more restrictive rule. This outcome would consistently subordinate the licensing policy of the first state, violating the
principle of sovereign state equality. This solution works only to the
extent that one is content to throw the licensing state's policy to the
wolves.
This leaves us with a choice between allowing the residence state to
regulate and allowing the territorial state to regulate. As a general
matter, reasons exist to prefer territorially based regulation. 46 Residence-based regulation is problematic where a single rule must decide
the legal rights of more than one person, because the individuals may
hail from different states. In civil suits, for instance, courts must use
the same rule to adjudge the rights of both the plaintiff and the defendant, because the award that the plaintiff receives is no more and no less
than the judgment that the defendant must pay. The Court· cannot
apply the residence law of the plaintiff to the plaintiff and the residence
law of the defendant to the defendant. Territoriality is generally preferable because location is one thing that the two interacting parties
typically have in common.47
To solve this problem, one might decide that the law of residence
of the plaintiff (or of the defendant) governs. But this means imposing
nonresidence law on the other party. It creates uncertainty for the
other party, who must then investigate the residences of those with
whom she deals or interacts before engaging in any conduct with potential legal consequences.
Virtually any method of choice of law has some unpredictability to
it; the solution I offer below has "play in the joints" as well. 48 In
addition, some contexts certainly exist in which courts resolve concur46. One might be inclined to ask whether this argument would give Nevada a right to divorce out-of-staters without their first acquiring a new domicile: Nevada might adopt a "right to
divorce" provision granting an affirmative right to choose to be single. The reason that Nevada
cannot do this is not that Nevada law would conflict with home-state divorce law (although a
conflict would exist). Rather, the problem is that Nevada has no jurisdictional nexus sufficient to
grant a divorce if the plaintiff has not acquired a Nevada domicile. Nevada is not the "territorial
state" in such circumstances; it is simply a naked forum with no basis for applying its law. The
same is true where two parties leave their home state to get married elsewhere. In both the
divorce and marriage cases the supposedly territorial occurrence is a naked legal act; in the
abortion case, in contrast, the territorial event is a medical procedure.
A prolife state might, perhaps, argue that abortion is a naked legal act - that the territorial
state is nothing but a forum. But, if they were correct that the territorial state had no jurisdictional nexus adequate to apply its own law, then they would have to cease banning abortions
within their own territories. This they are undoubtedly unwilling to do, thus illustrating the
importance that prolife and prochoice states alike attach to territoriality.
47. Of course, telephone transactions and other interactions where the parties do not meet
face to face present more difficult questions. See BRILMAYER, supra note 29, at 226-27 (contending that territorial rules can be fairly applied to both parties in face-to-face transactions).
48. This is particularly true when the courts of one state must assess whether the other state's
law amounts to an affirmative license or merely a failure to regulate.
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rent jurisdiction in favor of residence-based regulation. 4 9 One therefore cannot categorically claim that territoriality trumps residence in
all cases. Furthermore, one could argue that the abortion context
presents none of the problems that plague residence-based regulation.
The prolife state that wishes to regulate the reproductive activities of
its citizens extraterritorially might eliminate all third-party problems
by relinquishing any claim to regulate the doctors or hospital staff,
instead criminalizing only the conduct of women seeking abortions.
In so doing, the state would avoid uncertainty problems; for each woman would know her state of residence and its laws, and the conduct
of third parties would not be affected.
In fact, however, if we are to eliminate concurrent jurisdiction by
singling out a unique, constitutionally adequate connecting factor, the
abortion context presents a compelling case for territorial rather than
residence-based regulation, for prolife states are undoubtedly unwilling to give up the right to regulate abortions within their own borders. so If the residence of the woman were chosen as a unique
connecting factor, 51 then prolife states would have to allow nonresident women to have abortions in local medical facilities. The fact that
prolife states have been unwilling to do this demonstrates the importance of territorial regulation in the abortion context. Indeed, the fact
that prolife states first concentrated on eliminating abortions that take
place within the state, and only now seem to be recognizing the potential for regulating local women who seek abortions elsewhere, suggests
the primacy of territoriality in the abortion context.
One might argue that the prospect of having to open their hospitals
to nonresident women seeking abortions would not seriously deter
prolife states from espousing a residence-based test. How many such
cases could there be? If states really wanted the option of preventing
local women from having abortions, they presumably would be better
off opening their hospitals in theory, for why would a woman from a
prochoice state go to a prolife state to have an abortion?
But this objection is mistaken. It assumes that the only reason one
49. See, for example, the internal affairs doctrine, which allows only the state of incorporation to regulate a corporation's questions of internal governance. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
50. A recent referendum in Ireland proposed both loosening the restrictions on abortion and
permitting a right to travel to other countries to obtain an abortion. Interestingly, the voters
rejected the former but approved the latter, suggesting that states care more deeply about regulating abortions on their own territory than about regulating their resident's reproductive activi·
ties elsewhere. See Alan Cowell, Challenge to the Faithful, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, § 6, at
10, col. 1.
51. Note that the state could not additionally base regulation on the residence of the doctor,
without recreating the problem of concurrent jurisdiction.
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would choose an out-of-state hospital is that it is out of state. In fact,
the out-of-state hospital may well be the closest hospital, or the cheapest one, or the best one, or the one nearest supportive family or
friends. If Pennsylvania's only basis for regulating abortions were the
residence of the pregnant woman, then Planned Parenthood could set
up abortion clinics in Philadelphia to cater to low-income women
from Camden, New Jersey. But surely a Pennsylvania desire to regulate the reproductive activities of Pennsylvania women while tempo~arily out of state does not imply a corresponding willingness to let
New Jersey women get abortions in Philadelphia.
The source of the intuition that abortion. regulation should be residence-based, and not territorial, may be the general assumption that
the law of the party's domicile typically governs family law matters. 52
Abortion seems to be a family law issue. But abortion implicates two
competing conflicts paradigms: family law, which is ordinarily residence-based; and health-care regulation, which one would expect to be
territorial. If forced to decide, the prolife state would most likely
choose the health-care paradigm and regulate territorially, if only because territorially based regulation is easier to enforce. 53 Whether or
not territoriality trumps residence as a general matter, then, it seems
to trump in the case of abortion; for states themselves perceive a
stronger interest in regulating abortions going on within the state. 54
The prolife objective, one suspects, would be recognition of. at least
two different bases for prohibiting abortion - territorial location of
the abortion, and the residence of the woman - either one of which
would suffice. 55 But the prospect of multiple bases for regulation is
52. RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 228-30 (2d ed.
1980) (divorce jurisdiction based on domicile); id. at 240-45 (alimony and support can be
awarded by the state of marital domicile); id. at 256 (traditional rule was that only state of child's
domicile could determine custody).
Another reason for the intuition is the fact that a test based on territoriality allows women to
evade local law. The problem with this argument is its failure to recognize that the state achieves
one of its policy objectives by forcing women to obtain their abortions out of state. To the extent
that states object to performance of abortions on their own territory, they achieve their goals
when those abortions move to other locations. Thus, a territoriality test allows each state to
achieve one of its policy goals - regulating health care within its borders - even if it must
sacrifice one of its other policy goals - regulating the reproductive activities of its residents.
53. The state would have great difficulty in tracing abortions occurring out of state, plus it
would have more difficulty in obtaining the necessary witnesses and evidence for a conviction.
54. Cf. BRILMAYER, supra note 29, at 145-89. There, I argue that choice oflaw is not a zero
sum game; that states may both gain if they cooperate in deciding which states' laws should
apply to which cases. By cooperating, they can allocate to each state the cases that it "cares
about" the most. Here, the argument is that states care most about the abortions that occur
within their territories. Therefore, all states would gain by relying on this factor rather than the
residence of the pregnant woman.
55. The prolife state would no doubt claim that it must be able to base jurisdiction on both
factors, because otherwise women will be able to evade local law simply by traveling to another
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precisely what gives rise to the potential for concurrent jurisdiction,
because prochoice states would undoubtedly also like the freedom to
apply their prochoice law if either of these bases was present. Prolife
states cannot credibly claim as a matter of conflicts law that they have
a right to have their policies prevail in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, any more than prochoice states can claim as a matter of conflicts
law that their policies should prevail if either the abortion takes place
within the state or the pregnant woman is a local person. 56 Where
policies directly clash - where one state prohibits what the other requires, encourages, or affirmatively licenses - then a single factor
must be chosen to divide the spheres of regulation fairly and equally
between the contending states. s1
The problem would be different if there were no such direct clash
- if the first state wished to prohibit certain types of conduct, while
the second was simply indifferent. In such circumstances, the first
state could cast its regulatory net more broadly without impinging
upon the policies or preferences of the second. 58 Neither state's policies would be subordinated in cases of concurrent jurisdiction.59 The
necessity for choice arises only where states have inconsistent preferstate. But circumstances may exist in which for constitutional reasons the forum state simply
cannot prevent the parties from evading forum law. The internal affairs doctrine, for example,
allows a corporation to evade state law simply by incorporating in a state with a favorable law.
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982). Similarly, individuals are surely entitled to evade a law they dislike by moving elsewhere and establishing a new domicile. States are not constitutionally entitled to do anything
they like simply because it prevents evasion of their laws.
56. Of course, each state could make such a claim as a matter of substantive right. The
prolife state claims that fetuses are entitled to protection in every state, and the prochoice state
claims the same for women seeking abortions. My point is that, once such substantive claims are
rejected as a matter of constitutional interpretation and the matter is left to the states, both states
should realize that the cases must be divided up fairly, with each getting an equal share of cases
to regulate.
57. States in theory have some opportunity to bias the division even if they are entitled to
nominate only a single connecting factor. The state with the largest population of women of
childbearing age might favor using the test of residence; the state with the largest number of
abortion clinics would favor using the territorial location of the abortion. I do not address this
problem here, because clearly states in fact have wished to regulate territorially even if they have
a small number of clinics and a large number of women. The problem has arisen, however, in the
context of interstate jurisdiction to tax, where states have used formulas that seem fair on their
face (they do not create the risk of multiple taxation) but are biased in favor of assets in which
the particular state is unusually rich. See generally BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 396
(noting that states use different apportionment formulas).
58. This conclusion assumes that states do not, per se, object to other states' applying their
laws to things happening locally, purely on the ground that they wish to protect their territory
from outside interference. In the international context, states arguably are sensitive in just this
way. Here, however, I am assessing offense to the territorial state simply in terms of whether
residence state regulation impinges on the territorial state's substantive preferences.
59. The criminalizing state's law would not be subordinated where the indifferent state was
able to take jurisdiction over the case and fail to prosecute, because each could apply its own law
in successive prosecutions.
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ences. This whole discussion of concurrent jurisdiction, in other
words, hinges on the argument that prioritizing the various connecting
factors, singling one out as constitutionally sufficient, truly is necessary because there truly is a clash between the policies of the contending states.
That is the argument to which we turn next. Application of a concerned state's law does not subordinate the preferences of an indifferent state. But where a genuine clash of policies exists, no
constitutional reason privileges the state with one particular substantive policy (a desire to prevent abortions) over the other by giving authority to the first if the woman either resides there or obtains an
abortion there, but giving it to the second only if both residence and
abortion are local. Why, then, should a difference between state laws
about abortion fall into the second category of inconsistent regulation,
rather than the first? Why is there a direct clash between prochoice
and prolife states, so that concurrent jurisdiction is inappropriate?
III.

INTERSTATE PREEMPTION

Advocates of residence-based regulation will probably claim that
no direct clash exists. They will contend that the case in which state A
tells someone to do the opposite of what state B requires is rare, and
abortion in particular does not present such a problem. If a situation
arose, where state A prohibited abortion while state B required it, the
argument might hold, and the territorial compromise would make
sense. But abortion is more like a case in which (for example) state A
requires a label on alcoholic beverages, warning purchasers of health
risks, while state B does not. A potential defendant can satisfy both
states' laws, according to this argument, simply by following the more
restrictive law. That means applying the warning label to wine and
not having an abortion. 60
This response, however, misconceives what the right to choose is
all about. Obviously, supporters of the right to choice are not advocating requiring abortions, nor are they espousing abortion as superior
to childbearing. Many abortion rights proponents find abortion morally troubling but simply feel that the state should leave the decision
up to the woman. Some strongly believe that the best solution is better
sex education and birth control, so that abortion will not be necessary.
Many would be quite appalled at the idea of the state's encouraging
abortion, perhaps out of memories of past state abuses such as invol60. Similarly, this argument supports the position that satisfying the laws of all states in the
right-to-die context is possible, simply by not exercising the right to die. Right-to-die legislation,
after all, does not require one to terminate life support systems.
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untary sterilization. If there are abortion rights proponents who actually want to encourage women to have abortions, perhaps because of
concern about the population explosion, they seem to be few and far
between - and very quiet.
The prochoice movement, instead, is about support for choice.
State laws that support choice guarantee a certain sort of freedom. A
woman should be free to choose whether or not to have an abortion
without interference by the state. This is the respect in which two
states interfere with one another's policy choices when each seeks to
apply its law to the same pregnancy. State A wishes to prevent the
woman from having an abortion; state B wants her to be free to make
up her own mind. Both states cannot have what they wish, for the
woman cannot satisfy the policy goals of both states. State B wants
her to decide for herself, and if she makes her decision according to
fear of criminal penalties from state A, then she will not act in accordance with the policies of state B. 6 1
Promoting autonomy, in other words, differs from encouraging
some particular use to which autonomy might be put. A woman may
want to maintain the freedom to have an abortion even though she
very much hopes and strongly believes that she will never find herself
in an unwanted pregnancy. She might want that freedom from legal
interference even though, for religious or moral reasons, she is certain
that she would carry an unwanted pregnancy to term. A state, similarly, may want to guarantee those within its borders the right to make
their own choices, even though it believes that abortion is morally
troubling, medically unfortunate, and a wasteful allocation of health
care services. A policy that grants free choice is different from a policy that encourages a particular decision. We have already mentioned
the example of the right to die; a state might wish to give terminally ill
patients a right to refuse medical treatment or to request physicianassisted suicide without affirmatively seeking to promote exercise of
the option. Freedom of speech and religion also provide individuals
with a sphere of autonomy in which they can make their own choices.
Consider as a general example the world reaction to the Salman
Rushdie incident. 62 Great Britain was offended by Iran's edict penal61. Of course, state B is unlikely to prosecute the woman for failure to make up her own
mind. But the fact that state B imposes no criminal penalties does not mean that state A's prohibition does not thwart state B's policies.
62. Part of the reaction to the Rushdie incident arguably comes from the fact that Iran had
no right to regulate Rushdie as a British citizen. But the outrage was not merely based upon the
fact that Iran had an inadequate connection to regulate Rushdie's writing. Iran's attempt to
punish Rushdie was an affront to the sovereignty of Great Britain, where his activity took place
and was protected. World reaction would have been very different if Rushdie had gone to Iran
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izing Rushdie's publication of The Satanic Verses even though British
law did not require him to publish the book. British policy was to
provide Rushdie with the choice whether to publish; retaliation for
exercising the right to publish directly undermines British sovereignty
over its territory. 63 For another nation to penalize the exercise of religious freedom or freedom of speech within the territorial United States
would similarly undermine U.S. territorial sovereignty. 64
When the state chooses not to regulate abortion, it appears to be
expressing indifference about whether or not the woman has an abortion. Similarly, a state might be indifferent about whether wine bears a
label warning about the dangers of alcohol. But while a state may not
care whether the woman has the abortion or not, it is not therefore
necessarily indifferent to the circumstances of the abortion decision. It
may be indifferent to the result of the decisionmaking process while
caring very strongly about the process itself. The state essentially
manifests a preference that the decisionmaking power be left to the
woman.
Here, the biggest danger to the argument might be the apparently
tenuous nature of the distinction that I am making between mere indifference and an affirmative desire to preserve the defendant's autonomy. This distinction may seem too slender a reed to bear such
constitutional weight. One could argue that state indifference and
state desire to preserve a sphere of autonomy are really one and the
same. To put it another way, one might think that every time a state
fails to regulate, it equally grants the freedom to individuals to decide
either way; it effectively grants an affirmative license. The "license"
characterization, according to this argument, is no more and no less
persuasive in the abortion or right-to-die context than in any other
situation where a state fails to adopt a law that criminalizes particular
behavior.
This concern is misguided. We can easily demonstrate the distinction, and its importance, by turning to Roe itself. Roe was clearly and
unmistakably an affirmative grant of autonomy, not a manifestation of
and published the book there, or if Iran had sought only to prevent distribution of the book
within its borders.
63. The British were also probably offended by the Draconian nature of the penalty; but
similar penalties imposed within Iran, such as stoning as a punishment for adultery, have not
provoked comparable international outrage.
64. This argument is not inconsistent with the view that free speech encourages publication
of ideas so that others can read them, thus enriching political debate, and so forth. Even if one
thought that this instrumental purpose was the sole end of free speech, one might well want to
pursue it by granting individuals a right to decide for themselves what and whether to publish,
because only such freedom can inspire the individual consciousness to produce the sort of valuable works desired.
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indifference. 65 One cannot possibly interpret Roe as simply holding
that federal law is indifferent on the abortion issue, or as simply noting
that no federal law criminalizes abortion. If a prolife state legislature,
immediately after Roe, had passed an antiabortion statute and attempted to defend it on the ground that Roe simply manifested federal
indifference to whether or not women had abortions - a lack of federal policy on the subject - courts would surely have rejected this
strange argument out of hand. If federal policy had been one of indifference, then the Texas statute challenged in Roe would not have been
overturned; the case would have been dismissed instead for want of a
federal question. Roe expressed affirmative federal policy on abortion,
a policy of leaving the decision to individual women. Roe, in other
words, has preemptive effect, while mere lack of federal regulation
does not.
Thus, a clear difference exists between the policy of indifference
and the policy of license. The latter results in preempting a contrary
state law, while the former results in no preemption because the state's
laws are perfectly consistent. The latter results in invalidation; the
former results in dismissal for want of a federal question. There may
be cases where determining which of these sorts of policies a particular
statute or judicial decision reflects is difficult. 66 When a legislature has
simply chosen not to regulate, it may have done so out of either indifference or affirmative policy. But federal abortion policy after Roe is
not one of these ambiguous situations. The conceptual and operational differences between the two states of affairs are pronounced;
clearly, prochoice policies typically constitute affirmative grants of autonomy. Prochoice policies typically have preemptive effect.
The importance of this notion of preemptive effect is illustrated by
a situation analogous to interstate preemption, namely federal-state
preemption. Federal preemption cases show clearly that a lack of federal regulation may conflict with a state decision to regulate but that it
need not. In order to resolve the issue, one must inquire into the purpose of the federal decision not to regulate and ask what it was
designed to achieve. Where the federal government chooses not to
regulate but the state decides to regulate, then state regulation will be
preempted if the federal failure to regulate constitutes a decision that
the individual should be left free to make his or her own decision.
Territoriality trumps residence; but residence law is invalidated
only if the two are in actual conflict. Federal law, similarly, trumps
65. A federal freedom 9f choice bill would also be an affirmative grant.
66. For example, how should one characterize a legislature's failure to criminalize possession
of small amounts of marijuana?
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state law, but only if the two are in actual conflict. The point of examining the federal preemption analogy is to show that, while determining whether there really is an inconsistency is sometimes difficult, the
inquiry is a meaningful and manageable one.
IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Federal preemption of state law results from the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI, which makes federal law the supreme law of the
land. 67 Where Congress possesses a valid basis for federal regulation,
such as the Commerce Clause, its exercise of that power may result in
invalidation of state law on the same topic. Preemption is primarily a
product of congressional intent, and determining whether state law is
preempted involves an exercise in statutory construction. 68 Whether
the state law regulates an area of traditionally strong state interest
does not matter, for federal law is automatically superior. 69 Yet federal regulations do not automatically preempt state law on the same
topic merely because the state law is more restrictive.70
Traditionally, the Court has recognized three ways congressional
action may preempt state law. First, Congress may explicitly define
the extent to which it intends to preempt state law. 71 Second, even
where Congress has not explicitly indicated a desire to preempt, it may
indicate a desire to occupy the entire field. 72 The third category is the
most relevant to interstate preemption analysis, although in theory the
first two might potentially apply. 73 Under the third category, state
law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law. 74 This can occur either when simultaneous compliance with both
laws is impossible75 or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
67. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2. For an analysis offederal preemption in choice-of-law terms,
see Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict ofLaws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEXAS L. REV.
1743 (1992).
68. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982).
69. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153.
70. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 89 (1990) (citing California v. ARC
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989)) ("[o]rdinarily, state causes of action are not preempted
solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law").
71. Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461, 469 (1984) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1983)).
72. Michigan Canners & Freezers, 467 U.S. at 469 (citing Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153, and Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
·
73. This article focuses on affirmative license as a basis for interstate preemption, but other
bases for federal preemption could also be relevant in interstate preemption cases.
74. Michigan Canners & Freezers, 467 U.S. at 469.
75. 467 U.S. at 469 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)).
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Congress." 76
The proviso that complying with both federal and state law need
not literally be impossible is important. In Franklin National Bank v.
New York, 77 the Court found a clear conflict between a federal law
authorizing national banks to receive savings deposits and a New York
law that forbade such banks to use the word savings in their advertising or business. Yet federal law did not specifically permit, let alone
require, that national banks advertise; thus, conforming to both sets of
laws was clearly possible. Only in rare cases does federal law require
individuals to do something prohibited by state law, or vice versa. 78 If
"actual conflict" were limited to such circumstances, courts would
find preemption much less frequently than they do.
What, then, does actual conflict consist of? Larry Tribe lists two
categories. First, "state action must ordinarily be invalidated if its effect is to discourage conduct that federal action specifically seeks to
encourage." 79 Tribe offers as an example Nash v. Florida Industrial
Commission, 80 in which state law denied unemployment benefits to
persons who had filed complaints with the NLRB. Second, "[s]tate
action may ... be preempted as interfering with federal regulation if it
encourages conduct whose absence would aid in the effectuation of the
federal scheme as interpreted and applied." 81 Here, Tribe cites City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 82 in which the court found a
city ordinance prohibiting late night takeoffs to conflict with FAA policies of insuring airport safety and efficiency that necessitated flexibility in scheduling.
A third category, which Tribe does not specifically delineate, bears
some resemblance to the second. State law will be preempted where it
conflicts with federal policy designed to provide individuals with the
flexibility or autonomy to make their own decisions. Fidelity Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, 83 like City of Burbank,
dealt with a federal policy encouraging flexibility. California banking
regulations prohibited banks from enforcing "due on sale" clauses in
residential mortgages in most instances. The Court held this regula76. 467 U.S. at 469 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
77. 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954).
78. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (state and federal law imposed
inconsistent labeling requirements).
79. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 482-83.
80. 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
81. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 485.
82. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
83. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
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tion to conflict with regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board.
The conflict does not evaporate because the Board's regulation simply
permits, but does not compel, federal savings and loans to include dueon-sale clauses in their contracts and to enforce those provisions when
the security property is transferred. The Board consciously has chosen
not to mandate use of due-on-sale clauses "because [it] desires to afford
associations the flexibility to accommodate special situations and circumstances" ... [T]he California courts have forbidden a federal savings
and loan to enforce a due-on-sale clause solely "at its option" and have
deprived the lender of the "flexibility" given it by the Board. 84
Just as federal law may give a bank or an individual the flexibility
to decide either way, so may federal law also be a grant of autonomy.
Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining
Board 85 illustrates this principle. The federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act86 had been enacted to enable individual farmers to join together voluntarily in cooperative associations to protect their
bargaining position against powerful agricultural processors. The Act
made it unlawful for either processors or producers' associations to
coerce any producer "in the exercise of his right to join . . . or to
refrain from joining" a producers' association. 87 The Michigan statute
in question established a state-administered system that organized producers' associations and certified them as exclusive bargaining agents
for all producers of some particular product. A group of asparagus
growers challenged the Michigan Act, and the Supreme Court found
that it was preempted.
The Court acknowledged that the federal Act contained no preemptive language; indeed, the Act explicitly stated that it should not
be construed to change or modify existing State law. 88 But the Court
accepted the growers' argument that, although the chief purpose of the
federal act was to facilitate formation of agricultural cooperatives, it
was also designed to preserve the free choice of producers to join cooperatives or not, as they saw fit. 89
Congress' intent to shield producers from coercion by both processors
and producers' associations is confirmed by the legislative history of the
APPA, which reveals that the question of the producer's free choice was
a central focus of congressional attention .... [I]n passing [the Act],
both the House and the Senate unequivocally expressed an intent to pro84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

458 U.S. at 155 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 559.9(t)(l) (1982)).
467 U.S. 461 (1984).
7 u.s.c. § 2301-2306 (1989).
7 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1989).
467 U.S. at 469 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2305(d) (1989)).
See 467 U.S. at 470-71 (describing the argument and then agreeing with it).
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hibit producers' associations from coercing a producer to agree to membership or any other agency relationship that would impinge on the
producer's independence. 90

It did not matter to the Court that complying with both the state and
the federal acts was technically possible. 9 1
The federal-state preemption ·analogy illustrates that a clash may
exist even if federal law does not require what state law prohibits. But
it also shows that the category of "direct clash" is not as large as
might at first appear; it does not include all cases in which federal law
supports the claim of one party while state law supports the claim of
the other. On a spectrum, the degree of inconsistency between the law
of jurisdiction A and jurisdiction B decreases as one moves from left to
right. At the far left side, the two laws actually require the same result. At the far right, the two laws require inconsistent conduct -A
requires what B prohibits. Between these two extremes, one can satisfy both laws by obeying the more restrictive of the two. But in federal preemption, federal law nonetheless invalidates state law in some
cases in this intermediate group. Similarly, a direct conflict exists between the two states' laws in some of these cases in the middle. I
would argue that in these cases the law of one state must give way and,
furthermore, that state prochoice laws typically fall into that category.
There is no question, of course, that federal statutory law designed to
protect freedom of choice would preempt state laws prohibiting abortion. Roe v. Wade had exactly that effect, for the same reason. Undeniably, then, an inconsistency exists between residence states' laws that
prohibit abortion and territorial states' freedom-of-choice statutes or
Roe-like judicial decisions.
Federal preemption results from two factors: first, the existence of
a hierarchy, which gives federal law priority over state law; second, a
finding of conflict. Without hierarchy, conflict does not necessitate
preemption because one cannot know which of the two inconsistent
legal rules to preempt. As I have explained, prioritizing the contending laws must be possible. Without conflict, however, hierarchy does
not matter, because both jurisdictions can regulate concurrently. In
the federal context, the Supremacy Clause clearly establishes hierarchy. Federal preemption analysis, then, must focus on the second element, for the difficult issues will concern whether a conflict exists that
will eliminate the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction.
In the interstate context, hierarchy depends on the fact that the
90. 467 U.S. at 471, 477.
91. See 467 U.S. at 478 n.21.
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territorial state takes priority over the state of residence. 92 As in federal preemption, then, difficulties are more likely to center on whether
there is a conflict. I am not claiming here that federal-state and interstate preemption are identical; they may very well differ in some respects. 93 But they are similar in that both hinge on whether
concurrent jurisdiction is appropriate, for in both an established hierarchy specifies what to do when only one state can regulate. Concurrent jurisdiction turns on whether a conflict exists; the federal
preemption cases illustrate that a conflict exists between state laws
that seek to regulate certain behavior such as abortion and those that
seek to grant an individual the autonomy to make up her own mind.
V.

INTERSTATE PREEMPTION AND ABORTION

While this examination of preemption cases illustrates the general
principle underlying interstate preemption, there is one clear problem
with applying the analysis directly. The interstate context differs from
the federal-state context in an important respect: states rarely have a
chance to review one another's statutes, so we rarely have direct evidence that the territorial state finds its own statute inconsistent with
the law of the state of residency. We are asking the residence state not
to prosecute an abortion taking place in a state where abortion is legal
so long as the legality of abortion in the territorial state reflects an
affirmative policy granting autonomy rather than mere indifference.
But how is the residence state supposed to ascertain what the territorial state's policy is, absent a declaration by the territorial state on the
consistency of the two laws? In the federal-state context, this problem
is resolved through the mechanism of Supreme Court review. A state
92. See supra Part II.
93. For instance, one could argue that the reasons for federal supremacy over the states are
stronger than the reasons for territorial supremacy over residence state law. Even if this is true
- if federal law is more "strongly preemptive" than territorial law - it does not matter, for my
argument only requires that territorial law be hierarchically superior, not that it be as hierarchically superior to residence state law as federal law is to state law. Obviously, federal law is "even
more superior," for it has the power to preempt territorial as well as residence law.
Whether the fact that territorial law is less strongly preemptive than federal law should ever
make a difference is unclear. One possibility is that, where it is unclear whether the two laws
conflict, one should presume conflict in the case of federal-state preemption but presume no
conflict in the case of interstate preemption. This position hinges on the assumption that errors
of wrongfully finding that a conflict exists are more costly in the interstate than in the federalstate context, while errors of wrongfully finding that a conflict does not exist are more costly in
the federal-state than in the interstate conflict. Conversely, one might argue that conflict should
be presumed in the interstate context, but not where federal-state preemption is at issue, on the
ground that one should not presume that Congress sought to override state policy choices. Cf
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2400-06 (1991) (holding that, for structural reasons of
federalism, Congress imposed federal law on state hiring practice only where Congress made a
clear statement).
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court might face great difficulty if it had to determine, without any
guidance from the federal government, whether federal silence preempted its regulation. But state courts do not experience such
problems; for if they make mistakes, the Supreme Court, sitting as the
authoritative expositor of federal law, can correct them.
Things are not so easy in the interstate context. Assume that state
A prohibits abortion. State B, where the abortion took place, does not.
Our analysis requires state A to determine the policy behind state B's
position. But it has less authoritative guidance than it would have if it
were facing a federal preemption issue, and no possibility of corrective
review. 94 How, then, is stateA supposed to decide whether the laws of
state B have the capacity to preempt its own laws? For one state to
interpret another's laws when they are ambiguous or unclear is always
difficult. I noted earlier that Roe itself clearly has preemptive capacity. One way of phrasing the question, then, is to ask whether state B's
law is like Roe; if it is Roe-like, then it will preempt the law of state A.
This leads us to ask what about Roe makes its preemptive capacity so
clear. There are several answers.
The first answer stems from the sorts of considerations that motivated the decision. Roe, like the state freedom-of-choice provisions I
will examine below, was motivated by the desire to offer women
greater reproductive freedom. In the statutory context, one can sometimes demonstrate this desire by legislative history, sometimes by the
wording of the statute recognizing the right, and sometimes by the
identity of the groups lobbying on behalf of the statute. In the judicial
context, one looks at the decision's underlying rationale.
The second sort of evidence consists of other situations in which
the statute or decision has preemptive effect. We may not have direct
evidence that state B would believe its law preempts other states' abortion prohibitions, because of the lack of interstate appellate review.
But other sorts of preemption may reveal B's intent. For example, if
there is a state constitutional provision preserving the freedom of
choice it will invalidate state statutes and municipal ordinances. Its
preemptive effect should extend to prolife laws of other states. Similarly, the preemptive effect of a state statute that prohibits common
law or municipal regulation of abortion surely rests on more than
mere indifference; it must stem from an affirmative desire to grant a
right of choice. 95 Conflicting statutes of other states are likely to be
94. One possible method of review would be interstate certification under which states would
request rulings from other states on unclear issues of law. See generally John B. Corr & Ira P.
Robbins, Interjurisdictionizl Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411 (1988),
95. In the city of Corpus Christi, Texas, for example, a right-to-life provision was put to
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preempted for the same reason. With these two points in mind, we
can take a brief look at some particular examples of state abortion
laws.
States vary greatly in their approaches to abortion. 96 Some have
declared a desire to protect fetal life to the maximum degree constitutionally permissible; others have sided with the right of the pregnant
woman to choose. The precise contours of a state's abortion law will
influence the extent to which it preempts the differing laws of the woman's residence. The laws of the states can be arranged on a spectrum, presented in Figure 1, varying from those with no preemptive
effect on the abortion prohibitions of other states to those with clear
preemptive effect. At the first extreme we find states that have themselves chosen to prohibit abortion; clearly the statutes do not clash
with other antiabortion states' laws, and thus there is no preemption.
Utah and Louisiana, for example, fit into this category. 97
At the other end, we find states with constitutional provisions that
protect the right to choose. 98 Ten states have express constitutional
provisions that protect the right to privacy: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina,
and Washington. 99 None of these constitutional provisions, however,
popular vote. See AntiAbortion Measure Rejected in Corpus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1991, at Al8.
Although it was defeated in a referendum, id., one can imagine what would have happened had it
passed. If Texas state law was Roe-like, then the municipal provision would have been invalid;
but if Texas law merely failed to take a position on the question, the provision would have
survived. Cf Robin v. Hempstead, 329 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y App. Div.) (holding that a local
ordinance restricting abortions to hospitals was outside the municipality's scope of power as state
statute recognized some nonhospital abortions as lawful), affd., 281 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y. 1972);
Kim v. Orangetown, 321 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding unconstitutional a local
law restricting performance of abortions to hospitals on grounds that it prohibited abortions
permitted by state statute).
Another sort of preemption occurs when a later statute appears to conflict with an earlier
statute. Here, as in other examples, preemption requires both inconsistency and hierarchy. The
fact that the later in time trumps the earlier provides hierarchy. But inconsistency must still be
shown, and the mere fact that the two rules point toward opposite results is not enough.
To demonstrate this point, assume that state' A has both a law invalidating contracts that
minors enter into and a more recent law declaring surrogacy contracts enforceable. If an underage woman enters into a surrogacy contract, we would presumably want to say that both laws
validly apply to her case and that the contract is invalid. The first law qualifies the second. The
latter statute does not trump the former - both are still in effect, and the contract would be
invalid.
96. A valuable general survey of state abortion provisions is found in NATIONAL ABORTION
RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE FOUNDATION, WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY STATE REVIEW OF
ABORTION RIGHTS (3d ed., 1992); see also Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 407, 417-33, 446-50 (noting several state provisions).
97. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302
(Supp. 1992).
98. See Pine & Law, supra note 96, at 433-34. If any states actually required abortions in
certain circumstances, they would be even further to the left, but none do.
99. Seven of the ten have relatively broad privacy guarantees. See ALASKA CoNsr. art. I,
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FIGURE 1

domicile
prohibits,
territorial state
requires

domicile
prohibits,
territorial state
authorizes

(no states in this (e.g., Maryland,
category)
Connecticut)
interstate preemption

domicile
prohibits,
territorial state
indifferent

domicile
prohibits,
territorial state
prohibits

(e.g., Utah,
(e.g., North
Louisiana)
Carolina?)
no interstate preemption

is expressly framed in terms of a right of reproductive choice. 100 In
some of these states, such as California and Washington, the state
supreme court has interpreted the privacy provision to protect a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. 101 The courts of yet another
group of states have recognized a state constitutional right to abortion
even absent any express right to privacy; the right is grounded in other
constitutional sources. 102 In all of these circumstances, the obvious
object of the constitutional protection is to grant freedom of choice;
state law is not simply indifferent as to whether abortions occur, but
affirmatively licenses the woman to decide for herself whether to have
an abortion.
Next to these situations on the spectrum are those states with no
express constitutional protections but with statutory provisions that
protect a woman's right to choose. 103 Connecticut and Maryland fall
into this category. 104 Maryland qualifies the right in various ways,
particularly for minors; a right to choose exists, but it applies only in
certain circumstances. In those circumstances, however, these states
§ 22; ARIZ. CoNST. art. I,§ 8; CAL. CONST. art. I,§ l; FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 23; HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. I, § 10; wASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. The constitutions of the three
remaining states mention a right to privacy. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5;
S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 10. However, the extent to which these provisions are intended to govern
the right to abortion remains less clear.
100. Legislation in at least one of these states, however, restricts the right to choose, suggesting that the privacy protection in that state does not extend to abortion rights. See Montana
Abortion Control Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-101 to -112 (1985).
101. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981);
State v. Koome, 530 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1975); cf. Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H.
1983). New Hampshire recognizes a right of privacy relating to bodily integrity in somewhat
similar situations.
102. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 356 So. 2d 623 (Ala. 1978); People v. Norton, 507 P.2d 862
(Colo. 1973); People v. Frey, 294 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. 1973); Helvey v. Rednour, 408 N.E.2d 17 (Ill •
. App. Ct. 1980); Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).
103. See Pine & Law, supra note 96, at 448-49, for a discussion of state statutes.
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-602(a) (West 1992); Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 20-209 (1992).
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clearly grant a pregnant woman the right to decide for herself. The
policies are clear; these rules would preempt antiabortion laws at the
lower levels of local government.
Indeed, the very fact that the state has taken affirmative steps to
declare a right of reproductive privacy, as these three states have, demonstrates that it is not merely indifferent. If it were indifferent, it
would have no reason for action; instead, the state would simply decline to adopt legislation prohibiting abortion. The fact that the state
has taken action suggests that it intends to protect the right to choose.
Although the constitutional or statutory declaration of a right to
choose does not compel a citizen to take any particular action - in
this sense, it is indifferent to whether or not women have abortions the law is not indifferent about the issue of reproductive freedom.
Furthermore, while such a declaration does not require any particular
action by citizens, it does require certain sorts of responses by state
officials. A constitutional or statutory declaration clearly requires
them not to interfere with the reproductive choices of pregnant women. This is the purpose of such declarations, and this purpose is the
source of their preemptive effect.
Most states adopt neither of the two extreme positions, neither entrenching a right of choice in explicit legislation or constitutional provision nor declaring a desire to prohibit abortions wherever possible.
In a sense, one might characterize these middle states as perpetuating
something of a legal "vacuum" on the issue; they appear simply to fail
to regulate. The "vacuum" need not be total, however; no state in the
Union, apparently, has a complete absence oflaw on the topic of abortion.105 Most regulate one aspect of the issue or another (by requiring
parental notification, by imposing waiting periods, by prohibiting
clinic harassment, by providing or denying public funding, and so
forth). But many states seem to exist in a vacuum with regard to the
other, unregulated, issues. How are we to assess the preemptive effect
of the state's failure to regulate in these residual areas?
New York provides an interesting example. If one looks at some
provisions of New York statutory law, New York may simply appear
indifferent. Two provisions exemplify this seeming indifference. First,
under New York law, no abortion may be performed after the twentyfourth week of pregnancy unless necessary to preserve the life of the
woman. 106 Second, public funding is available for abortions, but only
105. For instance, most states differentiate between pre- and postviability abortions. See,
e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 12L-12M (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-45.1 (1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS§ 11-23-5 (1981).
106. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.05(3) (McKinney 1987).
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if they are medically necessary. 107 Neither of these provisions gives
much indication of the New York position on the vast range of cases.
Does New York fail to regulate most cases because it wishes to preserve freedom of choice, or because it has simply failed to criminalize
abortion altogether? The answer is suggested by a 1972 case, Byrn v.
New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 1°8 upholding a pre-Roe liberalized abortion law on the grounds that the fetus was not a person
within the meaning of the state or federal constitution. The woman's
right to choose was suggested by the fact that New York law did not
recognize the fetus as a legal person.
Oregon presents another interesting example. Like New York, it
neither categorically supports a right to choose nor prohibits abortions. It thus apparently has a legal vacuum on the subject. However,
Oregon law does seem to favor freedom of choice in other respects.
First, Oregon law does not prohibit postviability abortions, as some
states do. 109 Second, the Oregon Supreme Court prohibits clinic harassment.110 Third, public funding is available in many circumstances
(as where the life or physical or emotional health of the mother is
endangered). 11 1 Hospitals owned by the state or its subdivisions may
not refuse to perform abortions. 112 These conditions strongly support
the existence of a prochoice policy. North Carolina, in contrast, provides an example of greater ambiguity. The state does not prohibit
abortions during the first twenty weeks of pregnancy, and it provides
public funding in many circumstances. 113 But no relevant case law
supports or even addresses the question of whether a woman has the
right to choose or whether the state should protect clinics from
harassment.
The most difficult cases, like North Carolina, arise where the state
107. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 365-a(2) (McKinney 1987).
108. 286 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973); cf. Schulman v.
New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 355 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1974) (holding requirement to file
fetal death certificate not invasion of privacy), ajfd., 342 N.E.2d 501 (1975). See also supra note
95 (citing New York cases in which local antiabortion ordinances were held preempted).
109. Compare, for instance, the law of Wyoming in this respect. Wvo. STAT. § 35·6·102
(1977) (prohibiting postviability abortions "except when necessary to preserve the woman from
an imminent peril that substantially endangers her life or health, according to appropriate medical judgment.").
110. See State v. Clowes, 801 P.2d 789 (Or. 1990) (holding that Oregon legislature made
considered decision to permit abortion; choice-of-evils defense to clinic harassment is invalid
because abortion decision is between a woman and her doctor).
111. Cf. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Department of Human Resources of Or., 663 P.2d
1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that state constitution protects right to funding for medically
necessary abortions), ajfd. on other grounds, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984).
112. OR. REV. STAT. § 435. 475(3) (1991).
113. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-45.1 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 108A-SS (1992).
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regulates abortion to some degree but does not expressly declare in the
remaining cases whether the failure to regulate rests on a right to
choose. One must simply look at the relevant legislative and judicial
sources in the same way that one examines such sources for any problem of statutory interpretation. Does legislative history clarify the reasons for state inaction? Was an effort to prohibit abortion defeated on
an explicit reproductive freedom rationale? Does statewide law preempt local ordinances (in which case preemptive effect is clear)? Do
judicial decisions rely upon a right to reproductive choice? While the
question is not reducible to any mechanical process, the general enterprise is familiar. This is how courts always undertake to construe statutes. A state that fears its policies will be misconstrued can take
explicit action to clarify the intent behind its failure to regulate. 114
VI.

THE RIGHT

To

DIE: SOME SPECULATION

In some respects, the right-to-die problem is not very different
from the problem of the right to choose. The issue revolves around
the extent to which a state may apply its law to activities that occur
outside its borders, especially where the activity in question - here
the decision to die - is one that some states affirmatively protect. As
in the abortion context, a direct clash occurs between the policy of the
state that wishes to offer this choice and the state that wishes to foreclose it. In this respect, the analysis of the right to choose can be
extended to cover the right to die.
In other respects, however, the right to die differs. First, the right
to die is more likely to involve regulation of nonresidents; for instance,
the doctor involved in a physician-assisted suicide in state B may not
be a resident of state A, the state seeking to prohibit the practice. With
the actual resident, the suicide victim, now deceased, state A might
seek to penalize the doctor; but no obvious basis for application of
local law exists. 115 In the abortion context, conversely, we assumed
114. States have in some instances adopted legislative declarations clarifying whether they
are prochoice or prolife. These are useful guides to statutory interpretation. For example, Connecticut has indicated a prochoice stance. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 19a-602 (West Supp.
1992) (enacted 1990). Missouri on the other hand has enacted an antichoice legislative declaration. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.010 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (enacted 1974, amended 1986),
§ 1.205 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (enacted 1986).
115. The state might argue that it could penalize the doctor because the doctor advertised in
the state, practiced medicine on other occasions in the state, or knew that the patient was from
the state. Cf. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973) (civil
case holding a doctor to local unlimited damages law, and relying on similar connecting factors).
In the present context, reliance on such factors is problematic because multiple bases for jurisdiction create the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction. Because the law of place of the medical
procedure trumps other states' laws in case of a direct clash, these other connecting factors
would be invalid bases for jurisdiction.
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that the woman was a resident of state A, and thus the residence principle provided a basis for jurisdiction. For the right to die to present a
clash between two states' policies, some connection must exist between
the two states and the controversy sought to be regulated.
Such a connection may exist where a patient wishes to leave the
state in order to end her life. This points out a second difference between abortion and the right to die: if the patient is currently hospitalized, the state is in a better position to prevent travel altogether than in
the abortion context. This is particularly true if the patient is not conscious and her guardians wish to have her released from the hospital.
In such circumstances, the state will claim that it is not applying its
law extraterritorially; the abortion analogy thus does not hold. Indeed, the abortion analogy seems to support the state's right to prevent
death in this context, because it emphasizes the preeminent right of
the territorial state to regulate.
This argument highlights a third difference between the right-todie and freedom-of-choice issues. Ordinarily, the pregnant woman has
control over the fetus; she can take it from state to state without first
obtaining official permission. The state typically exercises a much
greater degree of control over the relationship between the patient and
her guardians. This difference contributes to the sense that the state is
in a better position to interfere in the right-to-die than in the abortion
context. It also suggests that differences may exist between the right
to physician-assisted suicide (where the patient is conscious and does
not have a guardian) and the right to termination of life support systems for an unconscious individual.
Despite these differences, my analysis of the right to abortion extends in large part to the right to die. Considering a series of different
right-to-die scenarios will illustrate the similarity.
In the first case, a patient currently of sound mind but fearful of
the ravages of her terminal illness goes to apother state to seek physician-assisted suicide, which is legal in that state. Her husband accompanies her. Their state of residence does not recognize a right to die;
the physician and the husband would thus be criminally liable if residence law were applied. This case parallels the typical abortion example. For reasons outlined in the discussion of abortion, the home state
is not entitled to attempt to stop the patient from ending her life, nor is
it entitled to prosecute the husband on his return.116
In the second case, the woman again seeks to travel elsewhere to
116. See supra Part II. Note that the husband must show, essentially, that he has third-party
standing to raise his wife's right to choose, because the territorial state extended the affirmative
license to decide either way not to him, but to her. The decision whether to allow third-party
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end her life, but her home state seeks to restrain her from leaving.
Here, the state does not seem to be regulating extraterritorially; the
woman is still within state boundaries. I would nonetheless claim that
the state cannot keep her from leaving. At this point, the right to
travel enters the picture. For the state to bar its citizens, generally,
from leaving the state would violate the right to travel. The only way
for the state to differentiate this case from the general situation where
one has a right to leave would be for the state to argue that this leaving
would be in furtherance of a crime (taking one's life). But because
taking one's life in another state that explicitly recognizes a right to
die cannot be criminalized, this argument fails. The right to travel
therefore protects the individual who wishes to leave to take her own
life.
The third example is the most difficult. Here, the patient is in a
permanent vegetative state, and the guardian wishes to remove he.r to
a locale that recognizes the right to die. The home state may be able
to defeat the right-to-travel argument by arguing that it is not preventing the woman from exercising her right to travel, but simply holding
that her guardian js not entitled to make the decision for her. Here,
however, we need to take a closer look at the state's guardianship law.
What decisions, exactly, is the guardian ordinarily entitled to make?
Assume that the state would normally allow the guardian to move the
patient from one hospital to another in order to obtain different treatment. In such circumstances the state should not be able to prohibit
the guardian from moving tl:ie patient to another state on the grounds
that the purpose of the move is illegal. For the purpose itself is not
illegal; termination of life support would be permitted if the patient
were already in that state.
These arguments support a rather broad right to leave the state to
terminate one's life. The only argument the state can use to prevent
the death would be the contention that the guardian could not decide
to move the patient regardless of the illegality of the motive. One can
certainly imagine states holding such a limited view of .guardianship;
in such states, the guardian would be prohibited from taking the patient out of the hospital for virtually any reason. In most circumstances, however, the right to travel would entail an interstate right to
die.

standing would not differ from the decision whether to allow third-party standing if federal law
granted a right to die but a state sought to criminalize the husband's assistance.
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CONCLUSION

Nothing intrinsic to the issue of abortion makes state failures to
regulate invariably preemptive. Given some circumstances, states
might simply fail to regulate abortion because they were indifferent as
to whether pregnancies are carried to term or not. In such a world,
lack of regulation would have no preemptive significance; the residence state might apply its law to abortions without offending the policies of the territorial state.
But considerably more may be at stake in the world we now inhabit. The regulation of abortion has generated enormous controversy
for many years. The decision not to regulate abortion is a considered
one that usually, if not always, manifests a policy ofleaving the choice
to the woman. The decision is in many or most cases motivated by the
specter of state regulation and entails a conscious rejection of that option. In these cases, the territorial state's freedom of choice trumps
the residence state's restrictions. Thus, constitutional law in the territorial state unambiguously preempts residence state law, for a constitutional provision cannot be interpreted as reflecting mere indifference
to the issue; it must be understood as an entrenched grant of autonomy. There is no other reason for adopting a constitutional provision.
State statutory law that recognizes reproductive autonomy preempts
contrary residence state law for the same reasons that it preempts local
or municipal law or state common law. State common law, similarly,
preempts residence state law if it would preempt local or municipal
law.
Preemptive effect is the exception in conflict of laws, not the norm.
Typically, residence state law does not interfere with the prerogatives
of the territorial state, thus avoiding the need for preemption. The
territorial state's failure to regulate usually shows nothing more than a
lack of concern whether particular sorts of activities occur. Thus,
where the territorial state takes no position on the issue, the residence
state may exercise concurrent jurisdiction. In the usual case, then, the
defendant's state of residence may apply its law to regulate conduct
undertaken in other states. But abortion, as in so many other respects,
is not the usual case.

